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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance can be defined to be an institution that constrains relations between 
corporate managers and various stakeholders, including shareholders, creditors, workers, 
suppliers, and customers.  Under this broad definition, corporate governance is a system of 
various sub-systems that are complementary to one another.  This paper focuses on two sub-
systems of the Japanese corporate governance: one on corporate finance and another on human 
resource management.  After briefly documenting the characteristics of the Japanese corporate 
governance in these two sub-systems, the paper discusses how each sub-system has been going 
through substantial changes in recent years.  Examining the data for 58 listed companies, we find 
preliminary evidence on the complementarity between the two sub-systems.  The firms that have 
non-traditional ownership structure (especially high foreign ownership) seem to have more non-
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1. Introduction 
  In the narrowest definition, corporate governance is “the ways in which the suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997, p.737).  Most studies on corporate governance in economics have traditionally 
used this narrow definition when they examined the corporate governance of individual 
companies or the systems of corporate governance in different countries.  Some recent research, 
however, started to stress the importance of understanding corporate governance more broadly as 
an institutional arrangement that involves not only managers and financiers but also other 
stakeholders such as workers, suppliers, and others.  For example, Tirole (2001, p.4) defines 
corporate governance as “design of institutions that induce or force management to internalize 
the welfare of stakeholders.”  Similarly Aoki (2001, p.281) defines corporate governance as “a 
set of self-enforceable rules (formal or informal) that regulates the contingent action choices of 
the stakeholders (investors, workers, and managers).” 
  When one takes these broader views of corporate governance, it becomes clear that a 
system of corporate governance consists of various sub-systems.  For example, corporate 
governance certainly includes institution that governs the relation between managers and 
financiers (including both shareholders and creditors).  In addition, corporate governance also 
includes the system of human resource management, which controls the relation between 
management and labor.  Other institutions that regulate the relation between managers and other 
stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, and sometimes local community in general, are also 
parts of corporate governance. 
  As Aoki (2001) points out, the various aspects of corporate governance are not combined 
randomly.  Corporate governance is a system in the sense that these various sub-systems are  
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integrated to reinforce each other.  For example, financial arrangement that heavily relies on the 
market for corporate control in disciplining the managers may work better with human resource 
management that puts less emphasis on firm specific skills and on the job training than an 
alternative that stresses firm specific skills that are acquired on the job. 
  This paper examines such link between the financial aspect and the human resource 
management aspect of corporate governance.  There is an increasing body of literature that 
considers the linkages between the sub-systems of (broadly defined) corporate governance.  
Many studies look at cross-country correlations of various aspects of the corporate governance.  
For example, Jackson (2004) find close correlation between the corporate finance and labor 
management practices at country level.   
Some studies examine the linkage by comparing different firms within a country.  For 
Japan, for example, Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) find that the firms with high foreign 
ownership and low bank ownership are more likely to downsize their workforce.  Also using the 
firm level data from Japan, Abe (2002) finds that the firms with close main bank ties adjust their 
employment only slowly.  We follow a similar approach and study the linkage by looking at data 
from individual Japanese corporations.  Japanese firms used to have a well known system of 
corporate governance with seemingly complementary sub-systems.  Recently, some corporations 
started to show substantial deviations from the traditional characteristics in the corporate finance 
and in human resource management.  We study if the recent changes in both aspects of corporate 
governance are related.  We examine if the firms that have non-traditional corporate financing 
also tend to have non-traditional employment practices. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly describes the 
stylized characteristics of the Japanese corporate governance to set the background.  We  
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especially focus on the complementarity that seems to exist between the financial arrangement 
and human resource management.  Sections 3 and 4 discuss the recent changes that some 
Japanese corporations started to show in the corporate finance aspect and the human resource 
management aspect respectively of the corporate governance.  Section 5 reports the results of 
empirical investigation.  Section 6 concludes by pointing out the agenda for future research on 
the link between corporate finance and human resource management. 
 
2. Japanese corporate governance 
  Many researchers have pointed out that the corporate governance of Japanese firms fits 
the stakeholder view of the corporate governance very well.  Shareholders seem to play rather a 
limited role in monitoring and disciplining corporate management.  Corporations seem to be 
operated in the interests of many types of stakeholders, including employees and customers. 
  The “Japanese” corporate governance is characterized by long-term relationship between 
the corporation and its many stakeholders.
1  A Japanese corporation has a long-term relationship 
with a bank, which is typically the largest lender, holds substantial amount of shares, and 
sometimes sends its (former) employees as board members of the corporation.  In addition to this 
main bank relationship, the corporation also typically has a long-term relationship with other 
shareholders, who are most likely other corporations, and the corporation often holds shares of 
those corporations through “cross-shareholding” arrangement.   
There exists a long-term relationship between the corporation and its employees as well.  
In the practice of “lifetime employment,” regular employees are expected to continue working 
for the same company until the mandatory retirement age.  The “seniority wage” that increases as 
                                                 
1 Surveys of Japanese corporate governance include Aoki (2001, chapter 13), Fukao (1995), Hoshi (1998), and 
Kojima (1997).  
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long as a worker works for the same country gives a strong incentive for workers to stay.  In 
return, the corporation provides various trainings for the workers to improve their skills.  The 
corporation does not have to worry about losing the skilled workers to other companies.  The 
workers do not mind acquiring skills that are only useful in the current company.  Thus, the 
lifetime employment system encourages the development of human resource management that 
stresses the importance of firm-specific skills. 
Long-term relationships are also observed between a Japanese firm and other types of 
stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers.  Long-term relationship between a manufacturer 
and its core suppliers, most prominently observed in auto industry, is a canonical example. 
The various aspects of Japanese corporate governance are related and reinforce each 
other.  In this sense, the Japanese corporate governance is considered to form a system of 
mutually complementary elements.  For example, dependence on concentrated bank loans (rather 
than diffusedly held bonds or stocks) makes it easier for financially distressed firms to 
renegotiate its obligations.  This reduces the chance of (premature) corporate failures and 
protects other long-term commitment, such as lifetime employment. 
  
3. Changes in the Japanese Corporate Governance 
  The Japanese corporate governance that we briefly described in the last section started to 
change in various ways around the late 1970s.  This section reviews major changes in the two 
aspects that this paper focuses on: corporate finance and human resource management. 
  Deregulation in corporate financing that started in the late 1970s allowed many large 
Japanese firms to use capital markets (rather than banks) for their financing.
2  Many corporations 
increased the bond issues (included convertibles and warrants) in domestic as well as foreign 
                                                 
2 For more detailed discussions, see, for example, Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), Chapter 7.  
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markets, and reduced their dependence on bank loans, a hallmark of the Japanese corporate 
financing. 
  Cross-shareholding, another characteristic of the Japanese corporate governance, also 
started to change.  The change started later than the decline in the bank dependence.  The 
magnitude of the change, however, has been equally dramatic.  Kuroki (2003) develops a 
measure of cross-shareholding by first calculating the proportion of shares in a company held by 
the other companies whose shares are also held by the company and then taking the average for 
all listed firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  According to this measure, the cross-shareholding 
declined from 18% in the early 1990s to less than 8% by March 2003. 
  As the Japanese corporations and banks shed the shares that they traditionally held in 
each other, foreign investors gradually increased the ownership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
3  
This is another notable change in Japanese corporate governance.  The share of foreign 
ownership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from about 4% in the early 1990s to more 
than 18% in 2002. 
  The human resource management aspect of the corporate governance also started to show 
some remarkable changes after the 1990s.  The changes have been observed in many areas of the 
human resource management practices, including employment practice, workers training, and 
promotion system. 
  The lifetime employment that characterizes the Japanese human resource management 
seems to have started to change in the 1990s.  Some observers even claim that the lifetime 
employment system no longer exists. (see Ono(2000) and Takahashi(2001))  Although it is too 
soon to declare the death of lifetime employment system, there are some evidence that suggests 
the popularity of the practice is indeed declining.  Table 1 shows the response to a couple of 
                                                 
3 See Ahmadjian (2004) in this volume for more details of this process.  
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questions posed in a 1998 survey by the Japan Institute of Labor (Survey on Human Resource 
Management and Job Consciousness under Structural Adjustment).  When corporations are 
asked about the typical tenure of employees, about 80% of them answered that employees 
typically work at the same company till the retirement age and that some continues to work or 
are reemployed for a certain period thereafter.  This tendency does not seem to depend on the 
type of jobs (management, specialist, clerical, or blue-collar).  When the same corporations are 
asked about what they expect to happen in the future, only 60% of them answered that the 
tendency to work till the retirement age and possibly beyond will continue.  20% to 30% of 
respondents believe that it will become more likely for the workers to be sent to work for other 
related companies or voluntarily quit before the retirement age.  The expected change is clearest 
for management and white-collar jobs.  Thus, many corporations are expecting that it will 
become increasingly difficult to preserve the lifetime employment system. 
  In addition to changes in the lifetime employment practice, the practice in recruiting new 
workers also seems to be changing.  Japanese corporations have traditionally given a preference 
to new (university) graduates when they hire new workers. However, the practice seems to be 
changing.  Figure 1 shows the proportion of companies implementing mid-career hiring for each 
year from 1994 to 2002.  Despite the worsening recession and increasing unemployment rate 
after 1998, the ratio of companies conducting mid-career hiring has been increasing.  This 
suggests that mid-career hiring, which was not a usual practice for Japanese corporations, is 
becoming more standard. 
The practice in termination of employment is also going through a change.  Figure 2 
shows the percentage of companies implementing employment adjustment.  The figure also plots 
the proportion of companies that adjusted the labor force through dismissal or early retirement.   
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Employment adjustment has previously been characterized by firms first implementing 
restrictions on overtime, then suspending the hiring of part-time workers and new graduates if 
necessary, and finally, only when unavoidable, encouraging early retirement and/or imposing 
outright dismissal. It is clear from Figure 2, however, that employment adjustment by means of 
voluntary retirement and dismissal has been increasing after 1998. 
The increase in the adjustments of labor force through dismissal or early retirement is 
consistent with the finding on the increase in the speed of employment adjustment estimated 
from the aggregate data.  Table 2 reports the result of such a study.  The table shows that the 
estimated speed of adjustment in the 1990s is greater than in the 1980s. Abe (2001) examines the 
relation between corporate governance structure and the speed of employment adjustment, and 
finds that the speed of adjustment is higher for the firms with smaller shareholding by financial 
institutions.  Thus, Abe’s result suggests that the changes in employment practice may be related 
to the changes in corporate financing that we discussed in the last section. 
The education and training of workers have also been changing.  Table 3 reports results 
from a survey conducted by the Sanwa Research Institute (2000).  In 2000, 46.2% of the firms 
had education and training programs for all regular white-collar workers, and 51.6% of them 
provided such programs for selected workers only.  When asked the plans for the future, only 
26.6 % answered that they will provide training programs for all regular white-collar workers 
while 71.3% of them plan to restrict the programs only for selected workers.  The methods of 
training are also changing.  In 2000, 80.8% of the firms trained workers primarily through on-
the-job training (OJT).  The proportion of the firms that plan to provide training primarily 
through OJT in the future drops to 72.3%.  On the other hand, the proportion of the firms that 
primarily use off-the-job training (OffJT) is expected to increase from current 14.1% to 22.5%.   
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Finally, the content of education is also expected to change.  In 2000, 33.6% of firms allowed the 
workers to choose the content of their training.  The proportion is expected to increase to 42.8%.  
In summary, many firms are planning to change their training programs to be more 
individualized, primarily based on off-the-job training, and given only to selected workers. 
Changes are observed in the system of promotion, too.  The Japanese system of 
promotion has been traditionally characterized by “delayed promotion” and the “seniority 
wages.”  The delayed promotion was considered useful to keep the workers motivated (for career 
concerns) for a long time.  The seniority wages discouraged the workers from leaving companies 
after short tenures and hence reinforced the lifetime employment. 
Both delayed promotion and seniority wages started to change in many corporations.  For 
example, Sanwa Research Institute (2000) reports that 39.5% of the respondent firms had 
brought forward the period when workers are put on different career tracks, suggesting a change 
in the delayed promotion.  61.6% are planning to move the period (yet) earlier in the near future.  
The use of seniority wages is also declining.  In determining wages, many companies are starting 
to consider the factors other than seniority, which include workers’ ability, performance and 
achievements.  As shown in Table 4, firms that took into account the performance and 
achievements of management level employees in wage determination rose from 55.1% in 1998 
to 64.2% in 2000. The firms that reflected the ability of management level staff to execute their 
tasks in their salaries increased from 69.9% to 79.7%.  The trend is not limited to management 
personnel but more widely spread. 
Another evidence of weakening seniority wages can be found in Table 5.  The table 
shows that individual performance is reflected in wage levels in 65% of firms for management 
personnel and 66.1% for non-management jobs. Among these, 41.3% (39.5%) of firms have  
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increased wage differentials over the past 5 years for management (non-management).  In the 
next 3 years, 51.2% of them plan to increase the wage differentials among management 
personnel and 49.2% plan to do so for non-management employees.  Sanwa Research Institute 
(2000) survey also obtains a similar result. In 2000, 42.3% of the firms that responded to the 
survey had increased wage differentials, while 65.2% intended to do so (again) in the future. 
 
4. Complementarity: A Simple Model 
  The last section described the changes in both financing and human resource 
management practices of Japanese corporations.  Are those two changes related?  Because 
corporate finance and human resource management are two important aspects of corporate 
governance, it is likely that these changes are related.  As one element of a system of corporate 
governance changes drastically, other elements may also be transformed to be consistent with the 
new system.  This section presents a simple model by Hoshi (2002) that implies such a 
complementarity between corporate financing and human resource management.  We use this 
model to motivate the empirical analysis in the next section. 
  The model augments the simplest version of the model in Tirole (2001), which focuses 
on potential agency problem between a financier and a manager, by adding potential moral 
hazard of workers.  Thus, the model describes the corporate governance as an institution that has 
two distinct aspects (corporate financing and human resource management) that deal with two 
moral hazard problems (one by the managers and the other by the workers). 
  First, we start by modeling the financial aspect.  Following Tirole (2001), consider an 
entrepreneur/manager who can choose between two types of projects.  Both types require the 
initial investment of I and yield R (>I) if successful.  If the project fails, the return is zero.  The  
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projects differ, however, in the probabilities of success.  Let  H p  ( L p ) be the probabilities that 
the “good” (“bad”) project succeeds.  We assume  L H p p > .  Thus, the “good” project has a 
greater expected return.  The “bad” project is assumed to bring private (non-monetary) benefits 
of B to the manager.  The manager is endowed with her own fund of A (<I).  Since the own fund 
is not enough to cover the necessary investment, the manager must raise I-A from an investor.  
The investor’s required rate of return is assumed to be zero.  The choice of project is private 
information of the manger, which creates a potential moral hazard problem. 
  We assume the “good” project has a positive net expected value but the “bad” project has 
a negative net expected value, in the sense  0 > − I R pH  and  0 < + − B I R pL .  It is easy to see 
that the investor rewards the manager only when the project succeeds so that the manager’s 
incentive to take the “good” project is maximized.  Let  m w  be the manager’s income (or 
equivalently net revenue minus the debt payment) when the project succeeds.  The manager 
decides to choose the “good” project if and only if: 
( 1 )  B w p p m L H ≥ − ) ( 
In words, the higher income that can be expected from taking the “good” project must be large 
enough to compensate for the lost private benefits.  The equation (1) implies that the manager 
must receive no less than  ) /( L H p p B −  when the project succeeds in order for him to choose the 
“good” project.  Thus, the maximum amount of income that the investor can expect is: 











R p . 
Tirole (2001) calls this the manager’s “pledgeable income.”  Since we assume zero required rate 
of return, the manager can raise funds to finance the project if and only if the pledgeable income 
exceeds the amount of funds that need to be raised (I-A), that is:  
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Note that a project with positive net value ( 0 > − I R pH ) may not be financed if the private 
benefit of the bad project is large (large B) or if the manager’s own fund is small (small A). 
  Bank monitoring can alleviate the problem of the moral hazard here.  Following Tirole 
(2001) again, assume the bank can reduce the private benefit of the manager (when he chooses 
the bad project) from B to b (<B) by paying the monitoring cost of b c .  Thus, under the bank 
monitoring, the pledgeable income increases to ] ) ( [ L H H p p b R p − − .  When this is greater than 
the amount of bank loan plus the monitoring cost, the bank loans fund to the manager, who 
invests in the good project.  The condition is given by: 
 ( 4 )  b
L H
H c A I
p p
b








Comparing (3) and (4), we see, for not too large b c , the bank monitoring expands the set of good 
projects that will be financed. 
  Alternatively, takeover threat in the stock market may discipline the manager and make 
him choose the good project.  First, suppose the manager finances the project by issuing shares 
(with control rights) to investors.  The amount of shares held by the investors (I-A) is assumed to 
be large enough so that the investors collectively can control the firm.  Following Tirole (2001) 
again, assume the stock market participants observe a signal after the manager chooses the 
project.  The signal can be “good” or “bad”, and the probability that a “good” signal is observed 
depends on the manager’s choice of the project.  Let  H q  be the probability that the signal is 
“good” when the manager chooses the good project, and let  L q  be the probability that a “bad”  
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signal is observed when the manager chooses the bad project.  Assume  H H p q >  and  L L p q < .  
In other words, the signal is assumed to be more informative than the result of project about the 
manager’s choice.  Let  G ν  be the conditional probability that the project succeeds when a “good” 
signal is observed, and  B ν  the conditional probability that the project succeeds when a “bad” 
signal is observed.
4 
  Suppose there are investors in the market who have the ability to increase the conditional 
success probability of the project when the signal is “bad” from  B ν  to  δ ν + B .
5  We call these 
investors “turnaround specialists.”  Since turnaround specialists can expect to earn more from the 
projects with bad signals than the current owners, they are willing to buy out those projects/firms.  
Assume the sales price of such a project to be  R B ν .
6 
  As Holmström (1979) showed, the optimal incentive pay can be contingent only on the 
signal, not the result of the project.  Letting  s w  be the payment to the manager when a good 
signal is observed, the manager chooses the good project if and only if: 
( 5 )  B w q q s L H ≥ − ) (  
Thus, the amount of pledgeable income is given by:
7  
 ( 6 ) 
L H





                                                 
4 Obviously, B H G H H q q p ν ν ) 1 ( − + =  and  B L G L L q q p ν ν ) 1 ( − + = . 
5 We do not model where this special skill comes from.  The new owners may be able to benefit from renegotiating 
various implicit commitments with the workers and the suppliers as argued by Shleifer and Summers (1988). 
6 In general, the sales price will be somewhere between  R B ν  and  R B ) ( δ ν +  depending on the bargaining powers 
of the current and new owners.  Here the assumption is that the current owner does not have any bargaining power.  
Giving some bargaining power to the current owner does not change the results of the model substantially. 
7 With probability  H q , a good signal is observed.  The manager receives  ) ( L H q q B −  and the shareholder 
expects to get  R G ν .  With probability ) 1 ( H q − , a bad signal is observed.  The manager gets nothing, and the 
shareholder sells the project to a turnaround specialist at  R B ν .  Thus, the expected payoffs for the shareholder is 
given by  )] ( [ ) 1 ( )] ( [ L H H H B H L H H G H q q B q R p R q q q B q R q − − = − + − − ν ν .  
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The manager can raise funds in the stock market and invests in the good project if: 





H H − ≥
−
− . 
  Let us now turn to the human resource management aspect of the model.  We assume that 
the manager needs to hire one worker to complete a project.  A good project needs a skilled 
worker.  If an unskilled worker is assigned to a good project, the probability of success falls from 
H p  to  M p  (we assume  L M H p p p > > ).  The worker’s skill is not important for a bad project. 
  Workers can acquire the skill only by making efforts, which cost them E, which is non-
monetary.  A worker’s skill and the efforts to acquire the skill are assumed to be private 
information, which create a potential moral hazard problem.  We assume that it is socially 
desirable for a worker who is assigned to a good project to make an effort to acquire the skill, 
that is  R p E R p M H > − . 
  We consider two alternative ways to alleviate this moral hazard problem.  First, suppose a 
firm can pay e to train a worker to be skilled.  Assume, in this case, the worker does not have to 
exert any efforts to acquire the skill.
8  We assume e ≤ E, i.e., the training cost for the firm does 
not exceed the cost of individual efforts to acquire the skill.  Let w* be the market wage for an 
unskilled worker.  The total cost for the firm to hire an unskilled worker and provide training is 
given by w*+e.  
  Alternatively, we assume the firm can try to find a skilled worker in the labor market, 
which provides a signal that is correlated with the skill of the worker.  Let  H r  be the probability 
that a good signal is observed when the worker has made efforts and acquired the skill.  We 
assume that the probability of a good signal when the worker has not made the efforts is zero.  
                                                 
8 The result does not change if we assume that the worker’s effort is reduced compared with the self-training case.  
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Thus, a firm can secure a skilled worker by hiring a worker with a good signal.  Let w be the 
wage paid for such a skilled worker.  Then, workers have incentive to invest in the skill if and 
only if: 
( 8 )  * w E w rH ≥ − . 
If we assume that the firm has all the bargaining power, the equilibrium wage for high skilled 
workers is given by: 








  This model includes two alternative ways to alleviate the agency problem between the 
manager and the investor and two alternative ways to mitigate the agency problem between the 
worker and the manager.  To deal with the agency problem between the manager and the 
investor, one can rely on bank monitoring or one can use the signal from the stock market.  To 
deal with the agency problem between the manager and the worker, the manager can provide the 
in-house training to the (unskilled) worker or can go to the labor market with high enough wage 
to motivate the workers to invest in their own skills.  Two sets of two alternative practices give 
us four combinations of these practices: (1) bank financing and in-house training, (2) stock 
market financing and in-house training, (3) bank financing and self-training (by the worker), and 
(4) stock market financing and self-training.  In the rest of this section, we compare these four 
alternative arrangements of corporate governance, focusing on how successfully each 
arrangement can address the moral hazard problems. 
  Although the model includes two moral hazard problems, the one for the worker is 
completely solved by either of the mechanism.  In equilibrium, the workers acquire the skills in 
either case.  The difference is just the cost to achieve the efficient outcome.  The cost difference 
influences the amount of the income that the manager can “pledge” to get financing, which  
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determines, together with the financial arrangement, the extent that the agency problem between 
the manager and the investor is reduced.  Thus, the comparison between different corporate 
governance arrangements comes down to the comparison of the amount of pledgeable income in 
each case. 
  First, let us consider the combination of bank financing and in-house training.  The 
manager hires an unskilled worker by paying w* and spends e to make him skilled.  This reduces 
the pledgeable income by w*+e.  Subtracting w*+e from the left hand side of the inequality (4), 
we get: 












− *  
as the condition for the manager to choose the good project under bank monitoring. 
  Next, consider the combination of stock market financing and in-house training.  A major 
difference from the bank monitoring case is that the firm is sold to a new investor when the stock 
market signal is not good.  We assume that the worker is fired and receives nothing in this event.  
Then, the manager has to promise a higher wage ex ante to compensate for the possibility of 
firing.  Since the worker will be employed after the training with probability  H q , the firm has to 





.  Adding the cost for in-house training, the pledgeable income of the firm is 
reduced by: 







Subtracting this from the left hand side of the inequality (7), the condition for the manager to 
choose the good project is given by:    
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  The third combination is bank financing and self-training.  Each worker invests the effort 
of E to acquire the skill, and gets a job if the labor market produces the good signal.  The wage 
that the firm pays to the worker is given by (9).  Subtracting this from the left hand side of (4), 
we get the following condition for the manager to choose the good project. 



















  Finally, let us consider the combination of stock market financing and self-training.  We 
assume the stock market signal is observed before the labor market signal.  Then, the firm gets to 
hire a worker and pays out the wage given by (9) only when it survives (with probability  H q ).  
Thus, the condition for the manager to choose the good project is given by: 

















  Note that (10), (12), (13), and (14) have the same right hand side.  Let T10, T12, T13, and 
T14 denote the left hand side of (10), (12), (13), and (14) respectively.  Each one of these can be 
considered as a measure of the extent that each combination reduces the agency problems.  A 
larger T implies that the condition for the manager to choose the good project holds for a wider 
set of parameters.  A simple calculation yields: 
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  The equation (15) compares the combination of bank financing and in-house training to 
the combination of stock market financing and in-house combination.  If this is positive, the 
combination of bank financing and in-house training dominates the combination of stock market 
financing and in-house training in the sense that there exists a set of parameters where the good 
project is chosen under bank financing and in-house training but not chosen under stock market 
financing and in-house training.  Similarly, the equation (16) compares the combination of bank 
financing and self-training to the combination of stock market financing and self-training. 
  The first three terms in each equation shows the difference between the cost of 
disciplining the manager through the stock market (higher pay for a manger with the good 
signal) and the cost of disciplining the manager through bank monitoring.  The lower is the cost 
of bank monitoring ( b c ), the higher is the reduction of private benefit achieved by bank 
monitoring (B-b), and the lower is the quality of the stock market signal ( L H q q / ), the more 
likely is the bank financing to dominate the stock market financing. 
  The last term of (15) shows the difference in the cost of in-house training under bank 
financing and under stock market financing.  Under the stock market financing, workers demand 
higher wages to compensate for the possibility of being fired, which makes the wage payment 
higher compared with the bank financing case.  Thus, the last term of (15) is positive.  Similarly, 
the last term of (16) shows the difference in the cost of self-training under bank financing and 
under stock market financing.  Since the firm does not have to hire a worker at all if the stock 
market signal turns out to be bad, the expected wage payment is smaller under stock market 
financing.  Thus, the last term of (16) is negative.  
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  Since the equations (15) and (16) have the same first three terms, (15) is always larger 
than (16).  Thus, there exists a set of parameters that make (15) positive but (16) negative.  In 
this case, bank monitoring dominates stock market financing if the workers acquire the skill 
through in-house training, but stock market financing dominates bank monitoring if the workers 
acquire the skill through self-training.  In this sense, we find complemantarity between the 
corporate financing and the human resource management: bank financing is complementary to 
in-house training while stock market financing is complementary to self-training.  
  The equations (17) and (18) compare the two alternative labor practices by holding the 
financial arrangement constant.  If (17) is positive, in-house training dominates self-training 
under bank monitoring.  If (18) is positive, in-house training dominates under stock market 
financing.  The higher is the cost advantage of in-house training (E-e) and the lower is the quality 
of the labor market signal ( H r ), the more likely is in-house training to dominate self-training. 
  It is straightforward to show that (17) is always greater than (18).
9  Thus, there exists a 
set of parameters that makes (17) positive and (18) negative.  For this set of parameters, in-house 
training dominates self-training under bank monitoring, but self-training dominates in-house 
training under stock market financing.  Again we find the complementarity between the financial 
arrangement and human resource management in this sense. 
  In the next section, we examine the data for Japanese firms to see if we find the 
complementarity between the corporate financing and the human resource management practices 
suggested by this model.  One approach would try to study how each combination of corporate 
governance practices influences the extent that the moral hazard problems are mitigated.  With 
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this approach, if we found one particular labor practice (for example, in-house training) is more 
effective in reducing the moral hazard problem under a particular financial arrangement (for 
example, bank financing) than the others, we would say the particular labor practice and the 
particular financial arrangement are complementary.  Even in our simple model, where the extent 
of the remaining agency problem is perfectly captured by the amount of pledgeable income, 
however, it is difficult to find an empirical proxy for the pleadeable income. 
  In this paper, we take an alternative approach that examines whether a particular human 
resource management practice is more likely to be adopted by the firms with a particular 
corporate financial structure.  Our model shows that bank financing and in-house training, which 
are consistent with the traditional Japanese corporate governance, are complementary to each 
other.  The model also shows that stock market financing and self-training are complementary to 
each other.  If these complementary relations exist, it is likely to find that most firms adopt either 
the combination of bank financing and in-house training or the combination of stock market 
financing and self-training.  Since the other combinations are not optimal, one would expect the 
firms with non-complementary combination would eventually change one practice to make it 
complementary to the other practice. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
  We employ the three datasets for the examination.  The data on human resource 
management practice come from the “Human Resource Management Systems Survey” 
(“Systems Survey” hereafter) conducted by the Institute of Labor Administration. This survey, 
which was most recently conducted in 1995, 1997, and 2001, asks a corporation to identify the 
presence or absence of each of approximately 180 human resource management practices. Firms  
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surveyed include listed companies, major non-listed companies with capital exceeding ¥500 
million yen and more than 500 employees, and small- to medium-sized companies with capital 
exceeding ¥ 300 million yen and more than 100 employees. We examined only those firms that 
responded in both1995 and 2001 surveys.  We chose and analyzed the responses to the questions 
that we believed most relevant to corporate governance and are available in both 1995 and 2001 
surveys.  Table 6 lists those practices.  
Most financial data are taken from the Corporate Financial Databank compiled by the 
Development Bank of Japan. The database contains information on the financial statements that 
listed companies file with stock exchanges.   
Finally, we use the Directors Handbook (Yakuin Shikihō, Tōyō Keizai Shinpō-sha), a 
quarterly publication of information regarding executive personnel of listed companies.  Using 
the data, we calculate the dependence on outside directors (measured by dividing the number of 
directors sent by the financial institutions and related firms in total number of directors) for each 
company.  
For 58 firms, we have been able to collect all the information that we use for our 
empirical analysis.  The summary statistics for these 58 firms are reported in Table 6.  Panel A of 
Table 6 lists the human resource management variables that we use in the analysis.  A human 
resource management variable for each firm is a dummy variable that takes one when such a 
practice exists in the company and takes zero when such a practice is absent.  For example, 
“annual salary system” takes one when the company uses annual salary system for some of its 
employees (typically in management positions) and zero otherwise.  The first two columns of 
Panel A shows the sample means of the variables in the 1995 survey and the 2000 survey 
respectively.  The sample mean shows how much proportion of the sample had a particular  
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human resource management practice.  For example, the table shows 10.3% of the firms had 
annual salary system in 1995.  The proportion increased to 30.7% in 2000. 
The other (mostly financial) variables that we use for our analysis are listed in Panel B of 
Table 6.  The table reports the sample means and standard deviations for the variables in 1995 
and 2000.  The ordinary profit is measured in million yen, and the number of employees is the 
raw number.  All the other variables are measured in percentage term.  The figures clearly 
suggest the declining importance of bank involvement in corporate governance of the firms in 
this sample.  Although the bank debt to total debt to ratio did not decline, both the shareholding 
by financial institutions and the proportion of bankers on the board declined substantially from 
1995 to 2000. 
For these 58 firms, Table 7 compares the ownership structure of the firms that adopt a 
certain employment practice to that of the firms that do not adopt such practice.  The table shows 
the comparison for 1995 and 2000.  For example, the upper number in the cell [annual salary 
system, bank ownership:1995] shows the average proportion of shares, of the firms that had 
annual salary system in 1995, held by the financial institutions in 1995.  The lower number in the 
cell shows the average proportion of shares, of the firms that did not have annual salary system 
as of 1995, held by the financial institutions in 1995. 
We examine two measures of the ownership structure: the proportion of shares held by 
banks and the proportion of shares held by foreigners.  The bank ownership is considered to be 
high for the firms that still maintain the traditional main bank relationship.  Abe (2002) finds that 
these firms also tend to have slow speed of labor adjustment.  We look at whether these firms 
also share the same tendency in other labor practices.  
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The foreign ownership is considered to be high for the firms that have substantially 
moved away from the traditional Japanese corporate financing.  Ahmadjian (2004) indeed finds 
that the corporate governance at firms with high foreign ownership seems different from that at 
traditional Japanese firms.  She finds that the firms with high foreign ownership tend to have 
higher levels of board independence, more disclosure, and exhibit other governance practices 
often associated with the “Anglo-American” standard.  She also finds that the firms with high 
foreign ownership and low bank ownership are less reluctant to downsize when they are in 
distress. 
The results in the table suggest several interesting differences in the ownership structure 
between the firms that have a certain employment practice and those that do not, and confirm our 
suspicion that the two recent changes in the human resource management may be (at least 
partially) related to the changes in the corporate financing.  The first row compares the 
ownership structure of the firms that have adopted the annual salary system to those that have not.  
The annual salary system literally means that the salaries are determined at annual rate, not 
monthly or weekly, but in Japan the annual salary system means that the annual salary is 
determined by achievements and performance during the previous year.  Thus, the annual salary 
system is a clear deviation from the traditional practice of seniority wages where the level of 
salary is heavily influenced by the age of the employee regardless of the performance.  The table 
shows that the foreign ownership of the firms that have annual salary system tend to be a little bit 
higher in 2000, but the difference is not statistically significant.   
Linking the amount of bonus to a measure of achievement (rather than the amount of 
regular salary) is another deviation from the traditional practice.  The table shows that the firms  
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that link the bonuses to achievement tend to have high foreign ownership in 1995, but the 
difference is again insignificant. 
The third row compares the firms that use irregular working hour system and those that 
do not.  The advantage of introducing irregular working hours is that working hours can be kept 
flexible to match fluctuations in the intensity of business activity, or that, as in flextime, working 
hours can be left to the discretion of the employees.  Either way, firms introduce irregular 
working hours to execute business more efficiently. In Japan, most firms with irregular working 
hours changes the working hours seasonally over a year, rather than introducing a flextime. Thus, 
the use of irregular working hours can be a deviation from the traditional pattern, but may just be 
a compromise move to increase the flexibility of working hours without moving all the way to 
flextime.  The result in the table suggests that the firms that have irregular working hours tend to 
have marginally significantly higher bank ownership.  They also tend to have high foreign 
ownership, but this result is not statistically significant.  Thus, the firms with traditional 
ownership structure seem to use irregular working hours.  This is consistent with the idea that the 
irregular working hour system is an attempt to introduce flexibility to the traditional labor 
management without drastically changing the traditional practice. 
Length-of-service awards encourage employees to remain in a firm over a long time.  
Thus, the practice fits very well with the traditional Japanese human resource management that 
promotes long-term employment.  Table 7 suggests that the firms that have length-of-services 
awards tend to have low foreign ownership, suggesting they are indeed more likely to have the 
traditional ownership structure.  The result is statistically significant for 2000. 
To maintain fairness of personnel evaluation by minimizing discrepancies in evaluation 
standards between evaluators, some corporations have systematic program to train the evaluators.   
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As the wages and promotion come to depend more on merits and performances, the importance 
of personnel evaluation increases and hence the importance of training evaluators.  Table 7 
shows that the firms that provide such training for evaluators tend to have higher bank ownership 
in 2000, suggesting that the firms with traditional ownership structure are more likely to adopt 
this practice.  The difference is statistically significant at 10% level. 
Company sponsored education program and education abroad program are important 
components of off-the-job training (OffJT).  Japanese companies traditionally relied more 
heavily on on-the-job training (OJT), although some major companies had OffJT programs such 
as education abroad programs as well.  The table shows that the firms that have these OffJT 
programs tend to have higher bank ownership.  The difference is statistically significant for 
education abroad program in both 1995 and 2000.  Interestingly, the firms that have high foreign 
ownership also tend to have these education programs.  Another way to encourage OffJT is to 
provide financial assistance for self-training.  Here we do not find any correlation with the 
ownership structure. 
In traditional Japanese companies, it was rare to find female managers.  In many 
companies, career tracks for female workers are different from their male counterpart.  Women 
are expected to quit the firm when they get married, and training programs for them were often 
more limited than those for men.  As some companies started to change their employment 
practices toward more merit-based ones, we have started to see the number of female managers 
to increase.  The figures in Table 7 show that the firms that have female managers tend to have 
higher foreign ownership compared with those firms that do not have female managers.  The 
result is statistically significant for 2000.  In 2000, the firms with high bank ownership also seem 
to be more likely to have female managers.  
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The firms that had in-house venture system in 2000 seem to have higher bank ownership.  
The number of firms that had in-house venture system, however, was very small both in 1995 
and 2000 (Table 6).  Thus, the result may not be reliable. 
   Shukko is a system of inter-company employee transfer, which has been used by many 
Japanese companies.  Under shukko, an employee is transferred (often temporarily) to work in a 
different company.  Shukko is used, for example, in a group of related firms to move employees 
from a firm that is experiencing excess labor force to another firm in the group that is 
experiencing labor shortage.  In many cases, shukko is an integral part of the employee training 
program, where an employee is temporarily sent to a different company to develop new skills.  In 
some cases, shukko can be permanent in the sense the transferred employee is not expected to be 
called back to the original company.  Permanent shukko is considered to be a method of 
employment adjustment more than anything.  Many firms are reported to increase the use of 
permanent shukko to reduce the labor force without firing workers.  An increased use of 
permanent shukko can be seen as an early stage of movement away from the lifetime 
employment.  In many cases, however, a tacit agreement to preserve the transferee’s employment 
(at the new company) often exists.  In this sense, permanent shukko may be viewed as an attempt 
to maintain the lifetime employment system in the increasing volatile economy.  Table 7 
suggests that the firms that have permanent shukko had higher bank ownership than the others in 
1995, but the difference is statistically insignificant in 2000. 
  In many Japanese companies, promotion to a higher job (from section chief to department 
manager, for example) is strictly separate from promotion to a higher rank (from rank 5 to rank 6, 
for example).  Some companies use examinations to judge if an employee satisfies the standards 
for one or both types of promotion.  The exams to advance to a higher rank are observed more  
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often in a traditional Japanese human resource management, where the pay scale is more closely 
associated with ranks rather than jobs.  Thus, it is interesting to find that the firms that do not 
have such exams tend to have higher foreign ownership, although the difference is not 
statistically significant.  The companies that use exams to advance to higher job grades, however, 
do not have higher foreign ownership.  Instead they tend to have higher bank ownership. 
  Finally, the firms that have fast track system tend to have higher foreign ownership in 
both 1995 and 2000.  Thus, the use of fast track system, which is relatively new to many 
Japanese firms, tends to be associated with high foreign ownership in 2000. 
  Comparison of means of ownership variables suggest that certain human resource 
management practice may be indeed associated with a certain ownership structure.  If we believe 
that a substantial part of the recent changes in the labor practices of large Japanese firms has 
been motivated by the changes in the ownership structure, the result suggests complementarity 
between ownership structure and human resource management practices. 
  The results in Table 7, however, are limited for several reasons.  First, the number of 
observations is very small, which limits the power of statistical analysis.  Second, simple 
comparison of means fails to control for other firm characteristics that are related to both 
financial structure and human resource management of the firms. 
  We have tried to address the second issue at least partially by estimating Probit 
regressions that relate the various human resource management practices to the corporate 
financial variables with some other control variables, such as the size of the firm.   
  Table 8 reports four of the fifteen Probit models that we estimated for 2000 (each model 
regresses a human resource management variable listed in the Panel A of Table 6 on the seven 
variables in Panel B of Table 6).  We only report the regressions which show statistically  
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significant relations between the human resource management practice and at least one of the 
ownership variables.  For the other specifications, we failed to find any statistically significant 
relations between human resource management and ownership structure. The small number of 
observations seems to impose a serious limit. 
  The column (4) (to much the numbers with Table 7) shows the result of regressing the 
length-of-service award (takes 1 if the firm has length-of-service awards) on the financial 
variables.  The estimation result suggests that a firm with high foreign ownership is less likely to 
have length-of-service awards.  Thus, firms with high foreign ownership do not seem to 
encourage many years of services as traditionally Japanese companies do. 
  The next two columns (6 and 7) show the regression analysis for the company sponsored 
education programs (domestic and abroad).  For the domestic program, a larger company 
(measured with the number of employees) is more likely to have one.  After controlling for the 
size, the high foreign ownership still increases the probability that the firm has the company 
sponsored education program within Japan.  The bank ownership, however, is not significant.  
For the education abroad program, both bank ownership and foreign ownership increase the 
probability that the firm as a program.  These results confirm the pattern found in Table 7 holds 
even after controlling for additional factors.   
  The last column shows the regression result for the existence of female managers.  As we 
found in Table 7, a firm with high foreign ownership is more likely to have female managers.  A 
company with more concentrated ownership (measured by the proportion of shares held by the 
ten largest shareholders), which presumably mean that a company is closely held by other  
Japanese companies, is less likely to have any female managers. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Agenda 
  This paper has provided a brief overview on recent changes in two important aspects of 
the governance of Japanese corporations: financial arrangement and human resource 
management, and an examination of the complementarity between the two aspects.  The 
availability of data on human resource management at individual firm level limits the scope and 
depth of our analysis, but the preliminary investigation seems to reveal a set of robust findings 
concerning the effects of foreign ownership.  The companies that show high level of foreign 
ownership were more likely to have human resource management practices that deviate from the 
traditional Japanese practice.  For example, those companies were less likely to have the awards 
for longtime employees. 
  The foreign ownership, however, cannot explain all the changes in the human resource 
management practices that took place in Japan in the late 1990s.  For example, many companies 
adjusted their wage system to reflect merits and performances of employees.  These changes, 
however, do not seem to be related to the changes in foreign ownership. 
  There are several shortcomings in the current analysis, which make our conclusion only 
tentative.  First, the current analysis just examines the presence or absence of an employment 
management practice without asking more detailed questions about the ways the practice is 
implemented.  This may cause a serious problem.  For example, even when a firm introduces a 
bonus system based on performance, the difficulty of measuring performance may make it 
impossible for bonus levels to reflect the achievements of employees correctly.
10  It may be 
important to go beyond the mere presence or absence of employment management systems and 
examine the actual implementations. 
                                                 
10 For more on the relationships between measurement of performance, wage determination, and incentives, see 
Prendergast (1999), which discusses the incentive problem that arises in cases when it is difficult to objectively 
measure performance.  
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Second, the interpretations of the same practice can differ so widely between firms that it 
is hard to make sure that the practices of the same name indeed mean the same to two firms.  For 
instance, a contract employee system in one firm may mean the system to recruit and secure 
workers with certain expertise.  A system of the same name, however, may be used just to recruit 
low skill labor for routine works in another firm.  Thus, our results can be qualified, taking into 
account the possibility that a practice of the same name may mean totally different things in two 
firms. 
Finally, the small sample size is a serious constraint for this study.  This is especially 
clear in unsatisfactory attempt to estimate Probit models of the choice of each human resource 
management practice.  It may take a series of systematic survey to collect the data that would 
better illuminate the relation between corporate finance and human resource management.  This 
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Table 1. Retirement practice by job category (%) 
 
   managers  specialists  clerical workers  blue-collar workers 

















No mandatory retirement  1.8  1.4  2  2  1.2  1.2  1.5  1.5 
Mandatory retirement at a 
certain age but many re-
employed after that 
79 60.9  79.6  63.8 78 61.6 78.9 63.6 
Mandatory retirement but 
many transferred to related 
companies before that 
10.7  27.8 7.8 22.4 7.8 21.3  6.5  17.4 
Many retires voluntarily 
before the mandatory 
retirement 
2.7  2  1.7 4.6 2.6 6.3  4.7  8.9 
Others  7.7  7.8 8 7.3  10.4  9.6 8.4 8.5 
 
Source: Survey for HRM and sense of vocation under structural adjustment (Japan Institute of Labor, 1998) 
Note: The question asks each firm to choose a statement that best fits the current retirement practice and one that fits the 
future expected retirement practice for each job category. 
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Table 2. Speed of employment adjustment 
 
 




Table 3. Education and training of white-collar workers 
 
   Current  Policy  Future  Policy 
    A B A B 
Training provided for: (A) all 
workers or (B) selected workers  46.2 51.6 26.6 71.3 
Method of Training: (A) OJT or 
(B) Off-JT  80.8 14.1 76.3 22.5 
Training content selected by (A) 
employees or (B) company  33.6 64.3 42.8 54.8 
 
Source: "Investigation Report about IT Revolution effect on Labour"(Sanwa 
Research Institute,2000)   
Note: Table shows % of firms in each category. 
 
Period Speed  of  Adjustment 
Implied Number of Quarters for 
Full Adjustment 
1977.II - 85.II  0.199  5 
85.III - 91.I  0.197  5.1 
91.II - 2001.IV  0.213  4.7  
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Table 4. Factors that determine the wages (multiple answers) 
 
    Factor for wage determination 
  survey 
year  job or duty  job performance  achievement  age/length of service, 
educational background 
1988 70.1  69.6  55.1  72.6  administrative position 
2000 72.8  79.7  64.2  73.9 
1998 68.8  69.2  55.3  78.5  Other than 
administrative position  2000 70.6  77.3  62.3  80.6 
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Table 5.  Proportion of firms that have changed or plan to change the wage system (%) 
 
last five years  next three years 
   
   
   































position  [65.0] 100.0 49.7 41.3 8.4 50.3 54.4 51.2 3.2
other than 
administrative  [66.1] 100.0 49.3 39.5 9.8 50.7 53.2 49.2 4.0
 
source:  "Survey on Working Condition" (MHLW) 
Note: A value in [  ] is % of firm whose wage system reflects on individual's performance. 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A 
Mean     
    1995 2000 
Annual salary system  0.103   0.307  
Bonus linked to achievement  0.172   0.138  
Irregular working hours system  0.741   0.810  
Length-of-service awards  0.879   0.759  
Training for evaluators  0.741   0.690  
Company sponsored education program (domestic)  0.293   0.293  
Education abroad program  0.259   0.328  
Female managers  0.586   0.466  
In-house venture system  0.052   0.052  
Permanent shukko  0.466   0.448  
Financial assistance for self training  0.638   0.638  
Exam to advance to a higher rank  0.103   0.086  
Exam to advance to a higher job grade  0.362   0.448  
Fast tracking  0.052   0.103  
Small loan program  0.741   0.569  
 
Panel B 
Mean (Std. Dev.)     
    1995   2000  
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Table 7. Human resource management practices and ownership structure (average % of shareholding) 
    Bank ownership  Foreign ownership 
Practice Adopted? 1995  2000  1995  2000 
(1) Annual salary system  Yes  0.3474  0.3368  0.0808  0.1082 
 No  0.3774  0.3243  0.0819  0.0746 
(2) Bonus linked to achievement  Yes  0.3651  0.3349  0.1031  0.0898 
 No  0.3762  0.3274  0.0774  0.0850 
(3) Irregular working hour system  Yes  0.3931*  0.3434*  0.0906  0.0908 
 No  0.3204*  0.2645*  0.0567  0.0634 
(4) Length-of-service awards  Yes 0.3801  0.3228  0.0787  0.0704**
 No  0.3323  0.3459  0.1042  0.1336**
(5) Training for evaluators  Yes  0.3843  0.3500*  0.0823  0.0599 
 No  0.3457  0.2804*  0.0803  0.0972 
(6) Company sponsored education program  Yes  0.3891  0.3820*  0.1038  0.1414***
 No  0.3682  0.3062*  0.0727  0.0625***
(7) Education abroad program  Yes  0.4436**  0.4063*** 0.1267** 0.1421***
 No  0.3501**  0.2905*** 0.0662** 0.0581***
(8) Female managers  Yes  0.3746  0.3695** 0.0959  0.1259***
 No  0.3738  0.2926** 0.0618  0.0506***
(9) In-house venture system  Yes  0.3697  0.5388*** 0.1015  0.1685 
 No  0.3745  0.3169*** 0.0807  0.0811 
(10) Permanent shukko Yes  0.4060*  0.3460  0.0869  0.0871 
 No  0.3467*  0.3141  0.0773  0.0845 
(11) Financial assistance for self-training Yes  0.3895 0.3320 0.0941 0.0842 
 No  0.3474  0.3220  0.0601  0.0882 
(12) Exam to advance to a higher rank  Yes  0.3309  0.2884  0.0522  0.0248 
 No  0.3793  0.3322  0.0852  0.0914 
(13) Exam to advance to a higher job grade  Yes  0.4139*  0.3433  0.0744  0.0769 
 No  0.3518*  0.3163  0.0860  0.0928 
(14) Fast tracking  Yes  0.4684  0.3351  0.0557  0.1677**
 No  0.3692  0.3276  0.0832  0.0762**
Note: *, **, and *** denote the difference in the means of the column variable between adopters and non-adopters is significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 8.  Probit estimation: 2000 
 
 
  (4)   (6)  (7)  (8)  









c_bank  -0.3944   0.6039   1.5574 *** 0.1023  
  (0.4936)    (0.5425)    (0.5382)    (0.6621)   
c_foreign  -1.3199 **  1.2760 * 1.8133 **  1.7713 ** 
  (0.6095)    (0.7268)    (0.8275)    (0.8847)   
c_big shareholder  -0.6084   -0.1616   0.8117   -2.1471 ** 
  (0.6124)    (0.7679)    (0.7386)    (0.8742)   
ordinary profit/loss   0.0039   -0.0095   -0.0003   -0.0031  
  (0.0084)    (0.0071)    (0.0053)   (0.0124)  
employee  0.0015   0.0073 * 0.0015   0.0051  
  (0.0032)    (0.0044)    (0.0021)   (0.0051)  
0.7338   0.0396   -1.5662   -0.9695   exective ratio(from 
bank)  (0.9455)    (1.0306)    (1.2961)    (1.1220)   
borrowings ratio  -0.2182   0.1272   0.7140 *  0.0741  
  (0.2903)   (0.3481)   (0.3716)   (0.3961)  
Number of obs  58    58    58    58  
LR chi2(8)  9.16    13.81    21.98    19.49  
Prob > chi2  0.2415    0.0546    0.0026    0.0068  
Pseudo R2  0.1428    0.1968    0.2997    0.2432  
Log likelihood  -27.475814    -28.179003 -25.690336   -30.321653  
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